Cite as: 511 U. S. 39 (1994)
Opinion of the Court
benchmark for the revocation sentence, the Government asserts, can only be the very sentence actually imposed, i. e., the sentence of probation. In this case, the sentence of probation was 60 months; "one-third of the original sentence" is thus 20 months. But for two reasons, the Government continues, Granderson's 20-month revocation sentence must be one of imprisonment rather than probation. First, the contrast in subsections (1) and (2) between "continu[ing]" and "revok[ing]" probation suggests that a revocation sentence must be a sentence of imprisonment, not a continuation of probation. Second, the Government urges, it would be absurd to "punish" drug-possessing probationers by revoking their probation and imposing a new term of probation no longer than the original. Congress could not be taken to have selected drug possessors, from the universe of all probation violators, for more favorable treatment, the Government reasons, particularly not under a provision enacted as part of a statute called "The Anti-Drug Abuse Act."
We agree, for the reasons stated by the Government, that a revocation sentence must be a term of imprisonment. Otherwise the proviso at issue would make little sense.4 We do not agree, however, that the term "original sentence" relates to the duration of the sentence set for probation. The statute provides that if a probationer possesses drugs, "the court
4 Justice Kennedy's novel interpretation would authorize revocation sentences under which drug possessors could profit from their violations. The present case is an example. The District Court determined, just over 4 months into Granderson's 60-month sentence of probation, that Grander-son had violated his conditions of probation by possessing drugs. If Justice Kennedy were correct that the proviso allows a revocation sentence of probation, one-third as long as the sentence of probation originally imposed, then the District Court could have "punished" Granderson for his cocaine possession by reducing his period of probation from 60 months to just over 24 months. Justice Kennedy's interpretation would present a similar anomaly whenever the drug-possessing probationer has served less than two-thirds of the sentence of probation initially imposed. Surely such an interpretation is implausible.
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