622
Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment
tinguish] from other, [nonregulated] types," has been held inadequate to establish the requisite knowledge. See 959 F. 2d, at 261.
The Nation's legislators chose to place under a registration
requirement only a very limited class of firearms, those they considered especially dangerous. The generally "dangerous" character of all guns, the Court therefore observes, ante, at 611-612, did not suffice to give individuals in Staples' situation cause to inquire about the need for registration. Cf. United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250 (1922) (requiring reporting of sale of strictly regulated narcotics, opium and cocaine). Only the third reading, then, suits the purpose of the mens rea requirement—to shield people against punishment for apparently innocent activity.3
The indictment in Staples' case charges that he "knowingly received and possessed firearms." 1 App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 91-5033 (CA10), p. 1.4 "Firearms" has a
3 The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant's conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption, "deeply rooted in the American legal system," that, ordinarily, "ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution." Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 199 (1991). Cf. United States v. Freed, 401 U. S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) ("If the ancient maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse' has any residual validity, it indicates that the ordinary intent requirement— mens rea—of the criminal law does not require knowledge that an act is illegal, wrong, or blameworthy."). The maxim explains why some "innocent" actors—for example, a defendant who knows he possesses a weapon with all of the characteristics that subject it to registration, but was unaware of the registration requirement, or thought the gun was registered—may be convicted under § 5861(d), see post, at 638. Knowledge of whether the gun was registered is so closely related to knowledge of the registration requirement that requiring the Government to prove the former would in effect require it to prove knowledge of the law. Cf. Freed, supra, at 612-614 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
4 The indictment charged Staples with possession of two unregistered machineguns, but the jury found him guilty of knowingly possessing only one of them. Tr. 477.
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