Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 28 (1994)

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Cite as: 511 U. S. 600 (1994)

Stevens, J., dissenting

Congress therefore could reasonably presume that a person found in possession of an unregistered machinegun or sawed-off shotgun intended to use it for criminal purposes. The statute as a whole, and particularly the decision to criminalize mere possession, reflected a legislative judgment that the likelihood of innocent possession of such an unregistered weapon was remote, and far less significant than the interest in depriving gangsters of their use.

In addition, at the time of enactment, this Court had already construed comparable provisions of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act not to require proof of knowledge of all the facts that constitute the proscribed offense. United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250 (1922).6 Indeed, Attorney General Cummings expressly advised Congress that the text of the gun control legislation deliberately followed the language of the Anti-Narcotic Act to reap the benefit of cases construing it.7 Given the reasoning of Balint, we properly may infer that Congress did not intend the Court to read a stricter knowledge requirement into the gun control legislation than we read into the Anti-Narcotic Act. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 698-699 (1979).

Like the 1934 Act, the current National Firearms Act is primarily a regulatory measure. The statute establishes

there is no reason why anyone except a law officer should have a machine-gun or sawed-off shotgun." S. Rep. No. 1444, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1934).

6 In the Balint case, after acknowledging the general common-law rule that made knowledge of the facts an element of every crime, we held that as to statutory crimes the question is one of legislative intent, and that the Anti-Narcotic Act should be construed to authorize "punishment of a person for an act in violation of law[,] [even] when ignorant of the facts making it so." Balint, 258 U. S., at 251-252. The "policy of the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require the punishment of the negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells." Id., at 253.

7 See National Firearms Act: Hearings on H. R. 9066 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934).

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