Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 36 (1994)

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Cite as: 511 U. S. 600 (1994)

Stevens, J., dissenting

defendant "knew the item at issue was highly dangerous and of a type likely to be subject to regulation." Brief for United States 9.19 It is undisputed that the evidence in this case met that standard. Nevertheless, neither Justice Thomas for the Court nor Justice Ginsburg has explained why such a knowledge requirement is unfaithful to our cases or to the text of the Act.20 Instead, following the approach of their decision in United States v. Harris, 959 F. 2d 246, 260-261 (CADC) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. United States, 506 U. S. 932 (1992), they have simply explained why, in their judgment, it would be unfair to punish the possessor of this machinegun.

III

The history and interpretation of the National Firearms Act supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to

19 As a matter of law, this is the level of knowledge required by the statute. Therefore, contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 612, n. 6, I have not left the determination of the "exact content of the knowledge requirement" to the jury. I only leave to the jury its usual function: the application of this legal standard to the facts. In performing this function, juries are frequently required to determine if a law has been violated by application of just such a "general 'standard.' " See, e. g., Posters 'N' Things, ante, at 523-525; Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973).

20 The Court also supports its conclusion on the basis of the purported disparity between the penalty provided by this statute and those of other regulatory offenses. Although a modest penalty may indicate that a crime is a public welfare offense, such a penalty is not a requisite characteristic of public welfare offenses. For example, the crime involved in Balint involved punishment of up to five years' imprisonment. See Dotterweich, 320 U. S., at 285; see also Morissette, 342 U. S., at 251, n. 8 (noting that rape of one too young to consent is an offense "in which the victim's actual age was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of consent"). Moreover, congressional authorization of a range of penalties in some cases—petitioner, for instance, is on probation—demonstrates a recognition that relatively innocent conduct should be punished less severely.

635

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