Cite as: 511 U. S. 79 (1994)
Thomas, J., dissenting
ion on these issues,* we hold only that the Nevada Supreme Court erred in failing to recognize that Griffith v. Kentucky calls for retroactive application of McLaughlin's 48-hour rule.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
After concluding that the Nevada Supreme Court erred by failing to follow our decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S.
*Justice Thomas would reach out and decide the first of these questions, though it is not presented in the petition for review. He would rule inappropriate "suppression of [Powell's November 7] statement . . . because the statement was not a product of the McLaughlin violation." Post, at 89. It is "settled law," he maintains, post, at 88, that if probable cause in fact existed for Powell's detention, then McLaughlin's 48-hour rule, though violated, triggers no suppression remedy. Quite the opposite, Justice Thomas recognizes, is "settled law" regarding search warrants: A court's postsearch validation of probable cause will not render the evidence admissible. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30, 35, 34 (1970) (absent circumstances justifying a warrantless search, it is "constitutional error [to] admi[t] into evidence the fruits of the illegal search," "even though the authorities ha[d] probable cause to conduct it").
Justice Thomas maintains, however, that our precedents, especially New York v. Harris, 495 U. S. 14 (1990), already establish that no suppression is required in Powell's case. In Harris, we held that violation of the Fourth Amendment's rule against warrantless arrests in a dwelling, see Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), generally does not lead to the suppression of a postarrest confession. But Powell does not complain of police failure to obtain a required arrest warrant. He targets a different constitutional violation—failure to obtain authorization from a magistrate for a significant period of pretrial detention. Whether a suppression remedy applies in that setting remains an unresolved question. Because the issue was not raised, argued, or decided below, we should not settle it here.
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