Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 21 (1994)

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Cite as: 511 U. S. 863 (1994)

Opinion of the Court

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11 (opponent may move for sanction when litigation is motivated by an "improper purpose, such as . . . unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation").

B

In preserving the strict limitations on review as of right under § 1291, our holding should cause no dismay, for the law is not without its safety valve to deal with cases where the contest over a settlement's enforceability raises serious legal questions taking the case out of the ordinary run. While Digital's insistence that the District Court applied a fundamentally wrong legal standard in vacating the dismissal order here may not be considered in deciding appealability under § 1291, see n. 6, supra, it plainly is relevant to the availability of the discretionary interlocutory appeal from particular district court orders "involv[ing] a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion," provided for in § 1292(b) of Title 28. Indeed, because we suppose that a defendant's claimed entitlement to a privately negotiated "immunity from suit" could in some instances raise "a controlling question of law . . . [which] . . . may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation," the discretionary appeal provision (allowing courts to consider the merits of individual claims) would seem a better vehicle for vindicating serious contractual interpretation claims than the blunt, categorical instrument of § 1291 collateral order appeal. See Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U. S., at 529-530 (internal quotation marks omitted); Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U. S., at 474-475.9

9 We recognize that § 1292 is not a panacea, both because it depends to a degree on the indulgence of the court from which review is sought and because the discretion to decline to hear an appeal is broad, see, e. g., Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U. S., at 475 (serious docket congestion may be adequate reason to support denial of certified appeal). On the other hand, we find nothing in the text or purposes of either statute to justify the concern, expressed here by Digital, that a party's request to appeal under

883

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