City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 8 (1994)

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50

CITY OF LADUE v. GILLEO

Opinion of the Court

the other hand, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Black-mun, concluded that "the practical effect of the San Diego ordinance [was] to eliminate the billboard as an effective medium of communication" for noncommercial messages, and that the city had failed to make the strong showing needed to justify such "content-neutral prohibitions of particular media of communication." Id., at 525-527. The three dissenters also viewed San Diego's ordinance as tantamount to a blanket prohibition of billboards, but would have upheld it because they did not perceive "even a hint of bias or censorship in the city's actions" nor "any reason to believe that the overall communications market in San Diego is inadequate." Id., at 552-553 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). See also id., at 563, 566 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id., at 569-570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

In Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789 (1984), we upheld a Los Angeles ordinance that prohibited the posting of signs on public property. Noting the conclusion shared by seven Justices in Metromedia that San Diego's "interest in avoiding visual clutter" was sufficient to justify a prohibition of commercial billboards, 466 U. S., at 806-807, in Vincent we upheld the Los Angeles ordinance, which was justified on the same grounds. We rejected the argument that the validity of the city's esthetic interest had been compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property, reasoning that the "private citizen's interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate treatment." Id., at 811. We also rejected as "misplaced" respondents' reliance on public forum principles, for they had "fail[ed] to demonstrate the existence of a traditional right of access respecting such items as utility poles . . . comparable to that recognized for public streets and parks." Id., at 814.

These decisions identify two analytically distinct grounds for challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance regulating the display of signs. One is that the measure in

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