City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 13 (1994)

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Cite as: 512 U. S. 43 (1994)

Opinion of the Court

Often placed on lawns or in windows, residential signs play an important part in political campaigns, during which they are displayed to signal the resident's support for particular candidates, parties, or causes.12 They may not afford the same opportunities for conveying complex ideas as do other media, but residential signs have long been an important and distinct medium of expression.

Our prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression. Thus, we have held invalid ordinances that completely banned the distribution of pamphlets within the municipality, Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451-452 (1938); handbills on the public streets, Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416 (1943); the door-to-door distribution of literature, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 145-149 (1943); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 164-165 (1939), and live entertainment, Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61, 75-76 (1981). See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 486 (1988) (picketing focused upon individual residence is "fundamentally different from more generally directed means of communication that may not be completely banned in residential areas"). Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparent—by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.13

12 "[S]mall [political campaign] posters have maximum effect when they go up in the windows of homes, for this demonstrates that citizens of the district are supporting your candidate—an impact that money can't buy." D. Simpson, Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics 87 (rev. ed. 1981).

13 See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 57-58 (1987): "[T]he Court long has recognized that by limiting the availability of particular means of communication, content-neutral restrictions can significantly impair the ability of individuals to communicate their views to others. . . . To ensure 'the widest possible dissemination of information[,]' [Associated

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