Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 21 (1994)

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642

TURNER BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. FCC

Opinion of the Court

414 (1989). Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U. S., at 115; id., at 125-126 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983). Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny. See Riley v. National Federation for Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S., at 798; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, supra. In contrast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984), because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.

Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task. We have said that the "principal inquiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989). See R. A. V., supra, at 386 ("The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed"). The purpose, or justification, of a regulation will often be evident on its face. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 481 (1988). But while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not necessary to such a showing in all cases. Cf. Simon & Schuster, supra, at 117 (" '[I]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment' ") (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune, supra, at 592). Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates

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