Cite as: 512 U. S. 622 (1994)
Opinion of Stevens, J.
cess to free television is valid throughout the Nation. Indeed, the Act is well tailored to assist those broadcasters who are most in jeopardy. Because thriving commercial broadcasters will likely avail themselves of the remunerative "retransmission consent" procedure of § 6, those broadcasters who gain access via the § 4 must-carry route are apt to be the most economically vulnerable ones. Precisely how often broadcasters will secure carriage through § 6 rather than § 4 will depend upon future developments; the very unpredictability of this and other effects of the new regulatory scheme militates in favor of allowing the scheme to proceed rather than requiring a perfectly documented or entirely complete ex ante justification.
Justice Kennedy asks the three-judge panel to take additional evidence on such matters as whether the must-carry provisions really respond to threatened harms to broadcasters, whether §§ 4-5 "will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way," ante, at 664, and "the extent to which cable operators will, in fact, be forced to make changes in their current or anticipated programming selections," ante, at 668. While additional evidence might cast further light on the efficacy and wisdom of the must-carry provisions, additional evidence is not necessary to resolve the question of their facial constitutionality.6
To predicate the facial validity of the must-carry provisions upon forecasts of the ultimate consequences of their implementation is to ask the District Court to address questions that are not at present susceptible of reliable answers. Some of the matters the lead opinion singles out for further
6 The must-carry obligations may be broader than necessary to protect vulnerable broadcasters, but that would not alone be enough to demonstrate that they violate the First Amendment. Thus, for instance, to the extent that §§ 4 and 5 obligate cable operators to carry broadcasters they would have carried even in the absence of a statutory obligation, any impairment of operators' freedom of choice, or on cable programmers' ability to secure carriage, would be negligible.
673
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