670
Opinion of Stevens, J.
fied by special characteristics of the cable medium," namely, "the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by cable operators and the dangers this power poses to the viability of broadcast television." Ante, at 661. Cable operators' control of essential facilities provides a basis for intrusive regulation that would be inappropriate and perhaps impermissible for other communicative media.
While I agree with most of Justice Kennedy's reasoning, and join Parts I, II-C, II-D, and III-A of his opinion, I part ways with him on the appropriate disposition of this case. In my view the District Court's judgment sustaining the must-carry provisions should be affirmed. The District Court majority evaluated §§ 4 and 5 as content-neutral regulations of protected speech according to the same standard that Justice Kennedy's opinion instructs it to apply on remand. In my view, the District Court reached the correct result the first time around. Economic measures are always subject to second-guessing; they rest on inevitably provisional and uncertain forecasts about the future effect of legal rules in complex conditions. Whether Congress might have accomplished its goals more efficiently through other means; whether it correctly interpreted emerging trends in the protean communications industry; and indeed whether must-carry is actually imprudent as a matter of policy will remain matters of debate long after the 1992 Act has been repealed or replaced by successor legislation. But the question for us is merely whether Congress could fairly conclude that cable operators' monopoly position threatens the continued viability of broadcast television and that must-carry is an appropriate means of minimizing that risk.1
1 I have no quarrel with Justice Kennedy's general statement that the question for the reviewing court in a case of this kind is merely whether "Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence," given his caveat that Congress need not compile or restrict itself to a formal record in the manner required of a judicial or administrative
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