Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 45 (1994)

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918

HOLDER v. HALL

Thomas, J., concurring in judgment

any methods for conducting a part of the voting process that might similarly be used to interfere with a citizen's ability to cast his vote, and they are undoubtedly intended to ensure that the entire voting process—a process that begins with registration and includes the casting of a ballot and having the ballot counted—is covered by the Act. Cf. infra, at 919- 920. Simply by including general terms in § 2(a) to ensure the efficacy of the restriction imposed, Congress should not be understood to have expanded the scope of the restriction beyond the logical limits implied in the specific terms of the statute. Cf. Cleveland, supra, at 18 ("Under the ejusdem generis rule of construction the general words are confined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it").

Moreover, it is not only in the terms describing the practices regulated under the Act that § 2(a) focuses on the individual voter. The section also speaks only in the singular of the right of "any citizen" to vote. Giving the terms "standard, practice, or procedure" an expansive interpretation to reach potentially dilutive practices, however, would distort that focus on the individual, for a vote dilution claim necessarily depends on the assertion of a group right. Cf. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 150-151 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). At the heart of the claim is the contention that the members of a group collectively have been unable to exert the influence that their numbers suggest they might under an alternative system. Such a group right, however, finds no grounding in the terms of § 2(a).

Of course, the scope of the right that is protected under the Act can provide further guidance concerning the meaning of the terms "standard, practice, or procedure." Under the terms of the Act, only a "standard, practice, or procedure" that may result in the "denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote" is within the reach of § 2(a). But nothing in the language used in § 2(a) to describe the protection provided by the Act suggests that in protecting the "right to vote," the section was meant to incorporate a concept of vot-

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