Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995)
Opinion of the Court
prejudice to successive and abusive claims conformed to this Court's treatment of procedurally defaulted claims. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478; see also McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 490-491 ("The doctrines of procedural default and abuse of the writ implicate nearly identical concerns flowing from the signifi-cant costs of federal habeas corpus review"). See generally Sawyer, 505 U. S., at 338-340. The net result of this congressional and judicial action has been the adoption in habeas corpus of a " 'qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata.' " McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 486, quoting Senate Report, at 2.35
At the same time, the Court has adhered to the principle that habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy. This Court has consistently relied on the equitable nature of habeas corpus to preclude application of strict rules of res judicata. Thus, for example, in Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), this Court held that a habeas court must adjudicate even a successive habeas claim when required to do so by the "ends of justice." Id., at 15-17; see also Mc-Cleskey, 499 U. S., at 495. The Sanders Court applied this equitable exception even to petitions brought under 28
to the relief he seeks.' " Ibid., quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 17-19 (1963).
35 This Court has repeatedly noted the interplay between statutory language and judicially managed equitable considerations in the development of habeas corpus jurisprudence. For example, in McCleskey, the Court noted that the doctrine of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus "refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions." 499 U. S., at 489. Similarly, in Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court noted its "historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged." 433 U. S., at 81; see also Kuhlmann, 477 U. S., at 446-447 (explaining that the Court has both expanded and limited the scope of the writ); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 633 (1993) ("We have filled the gaps of the habeas corpus statute with respect to other matters").
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