Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 26 (1995)

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Cite as: 513 U. S. 298 (1995)

Opinion of the Court

Then, in Sawyer, the Court examined the miscarriage of justice exception as applied to a petitioner who claimed he was "actually innocent of the death penalty." In that opinion, the Court struggled to define "actual innocence" in the context of a petitioner's claim that his death sentence was inappropriate. The Court concluded that such actual innocence "must focus on those elements which render a defendant eligible for the death penalty." 505 U. S., at 347. However, in addition to defining what it means to be "innocent" of the death penalty, the Court departed from Carrier's use of "probably" and adopted a more exacting standard of proof to govern these claims: The Court held that a habeas petitioner "must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty." 505 U. S., at 336 (emphasis added).38 No attempt was made in Sawyer to reconcile this stricter standard with Carrier's use of "probably."

V

In evaluating Schlup's claim of innocence, the Court of Appeals applied Eighth Circuit precedent holding that Sawyer, rather than Carrier, supplied the proper legal standard. The court then purported to apply the Sawyer standard. Schlup argues that Sawyer has no application to a petitioner who claims that he is actually innocent of the crime, and that the Court of Appeals misapplied Sawyer in any event. Respondent contends that the Court of Appeals was correct in both its selection and its application of the Sawyer standard. Though the Court of Appeals seems to have misapplied Sawyer,39 we do not rest our decision on that ground because we

38 Even the high standard of proof set forth in Sawyer falls short of the Jackson standard governing habeas review of claims of insufficiency of the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 324 (1979) ("[N]o rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt") (emphasis added). See infra, at 330.

39 See infra, at 331.

323

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