Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 8 (1995) (per curiam)

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Next

Cite as: 513 U. S. 364 (1995)

Stevens, J., dissenting

Judge Brunetti dissented from the majority's analysis, but on a ground that is entirely different from that advanced by this Court in what appears to be its hold-California, 314 U. S. 219, 236 . . . (1941). Henry's federal due process claim is that the admission of Hackett's testimony, along with the instructions concerning it, deprived him of a fair trial. He argues that Hackett's testimony was not probative of any material issue in his case unless the jury assumed a fact about which it had heard no testimony: that Hackett's son's accusation was true. He further argues that the jury instructions encouraged the jury to make this impermissible, highly prejudicial assumption. His claim is thus that 'there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw' from Hackett's testimony, and that it is 'of such [inflamma-tory] quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.' Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F. 2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, [70] . . . (1991) (inflammatory evidence that is irrelevant may work a due process violation).

"Henry made 'essentially the same arguments,' Tamapua, 796 F. 2d at 262, in his opening brief to the California Court of Appeal. He claimed that Hackett's testimony was 'not relevant—it had no tendency to prove or disprove any disputed fact that was of consequence to the determination of the action.' He added that the jury instruction 'compounded the error' because, in encouraging the jury to see Hackett's testimony as relevant, it 'as much as said that defendant had molested [Hackett's son] 20 years before.' The Court of Appeal agreed, and wrote in its disposition that Hackett's testimony, while 'inherently inflammatory,' had 'no probative value at all.'

"We reach the same conclusion as to the essential identity of Henry's state and federal arguments regarding the prejudicial effect of the error. Under California law, a miscarriage of justice is reversible only when 'it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.' Watson, 299 P. 2d at 254. The federal standard, recently set forth by the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson, [507 U. S. 619] (1993), is phrased somewhat differently, but is essentially the same test; the Supreme Court held that in reviewing a collateral challenge based on a 'trial-type' constitutional error, a federal court will not reverse the conviction unless the error ' "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." ' Id., at 623 . . . (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 776 . . . (1946)).

"The errors that occurred at Henry's trial—the introduction of Hackett's testimony and the subsequent jury instruction—were clearly errors of the

371

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007