Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U.S. 374, 38 (1995)

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Cite as: 513 U. S. 374 (1995)

O'Connor, J., dissenting

or encouraged the USOC in the exercise of its right [to deny use of its copyright]").

These cases differ markedly from the "interdependence" or "joint participation" analysis of Burton and stand for the principle that, unless the government affirmatively influenced or coerced the private party to undertake the challenged action, such conduct is not state action for constitutional purposes. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., supra, is not to the contrary. In that case, the Court held that a private attorney's exercise of a peremptory challenge is attributable to the government and therefore subject to constitutional inquiry. Although the opinion cited Burton, see 500 U. S., at 621, 624, it emphasized that a private party exercising a peremptory challenge enjoys the "overt, significant assistance of the court," id., at 624. The decision therefore is an application of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 19 (1948), which focused on the use of the State's coercive power, through its courts, to effect the litigant's allegedly unconstitutional choice. Moreover, Edmonson stressed that a litigant exercising a peremptory challenge performs a "traditional function of the government," 500 U. S., at 624, a theory of state action established by Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946), that is independent from Burton and not relevant to this case.

Relying thus on Shelley and Marsh, Edmonson did not necessarily extend the "interdependence" rationale of Burton beyond the limited facts of that case. Given the pervasive role of government in our society, a test of state action predicated upon public and private "interdependence" sweeps much too broadly and would subject to constitutional challenge the most pedestrian of everyday activities, a problem that the Court recognized in Burton itself, see 365 U. S., at 725-726. A more refined inquiry is that established by Jackson, Rendell-Baker, Blum, and San Francisco Arts & Athletics: The conduct of a private entity is not subject to constitutional scrutiny if the challenged action results from

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