Cite as: 513 U. S. 432 (1995)
Opinion of the Court
We concede that this opposite rule (denying the writ) would help protect the State's interest in the finality of its judgments and would promote federal-state comity. It would avoid retrials, some of which, held so late in the day, may lead to freedom for some petitioners whose initial convictions were in fact unaffected by the errors that took place at their initial trials. The State's interest in avoiding retrial of this latter category of individuals is legitimate and important. But this interest is somewhat diminished by the legal circumstance that the State normally bears responsibility for the error that infected the initial trial. And, if one assumes (1) that in cases of grave doubt, the error is at least as likely to have been harmful in fact as not, and (2) that retrial will often (or even sometimes) lead to reconviction, then that state interest is further diminished by a factual circumstance: the number of acquittals wrongly caused by grant of the writ and delayed retrial (the most serious harm affecting the State's legitimate interests) will be small when compared with the number of persons whom this opposite rule (denying the writ) would wrongly imprison or execute. On balance, we must doubt that the law of habeas corpus would hold many people in prison "in violation of the Constitution," for fear that otherwise a smaller number, not so held, may eventually go free.
Third, our rule has certain administrative virtues. It is consistent with the way that courts have long treated important trial errors. See, e. g., Olano, supra; Lane, supra; Chapman, 386 U. S., at 24; Kotteakos, supra; see also 11 Wright & Miller § 2883. In a highly technical area such as this one, consistency brings with it simplicity, a body of existing case law available for consultation, see Brecht, supra, at 638, and a consequently diminished risk of further, error-produced, proceedings. Moreover, our rule avoids the need for judges to read lengthy records to determine prejudice in every habeas case. These factors are not determinative, but offer a practical caution against a legal rule that, in respect
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