258
Stevens, J., dissenting
Other examples of remedial statutes that resemble § 27A include the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. § 520(4), which authorizes members of the Armed Forces to reopen judgments entered while they were on active duty; the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) (1988 ed. and Supp. V), which provided for recovery of attorney's fees under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U. S. C. § 1411 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V); 10 and the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2255, which authorizes federal courts to reopen judgments of conviction. The habeas statute, similarly to Rule 60(b), replaced a common-law writ, see App. to H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., A180 (1947), and thus necessarily applied retroactively.11 State statutes that authorize the reopening of various types of default judgments 12 and judgments that became final before a party re-intent. Moreover, neither Landgraf nor Rivers "rejected" consideration of a statute's remedial purpose in analyzing Congress' intent to apply the statute retroactively. Compare ante, at 237, with Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 281-286, and n. 37, and Rivers, 511 U. S., at 304-311.
10 When it enacted the Handicapped Children's Protection Act, Congress overruled our contrary decision in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984), by applying the Act retroactively to any action either pending on or brought after July 4, 1984, the day before we announced Smith. See 100 Stat. 798. Accordingly, a court has applied the Act retroactively to a case in which the parties had entered into a consent decree prior to its enactment. See Counsel v. Dow, 849 F. 2d 731, 738-739 (CA2 1988). The Court's attempts to explain away the retroactivity provision, ante, at 235- 236, simply do not comport with the plain language of the Act.
11 The Government also calls our attention to 28 U. S. C. § 1655, a statute that requires courts to reopen final in rem judgments upon entries of appearance by defendants who were not personally served. See Brief for United States 24-25, and n. 17. While that statute had only prospective effect, the Court offers no reason why Congress could not pass a similar statute that would apply retroactively to judgments entered under preexisting procedures.
12 See, e. g., Del. Code Ann., Tit. 18, § 4418 (1989); Fla. Stat. § 631.734 (1984); N. Y. Ins. Law § 7717 (McKinney Supp. 1995); 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 991.1716 (Supp. 1994).
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