264
Stevens, J., dissenting
lar case in the affected category. Congress, therefore, had no way to identify which particular plaintiffs would benefit from § 27A. It merely enacted a law that applied a substantive rule to a class of litigants, specified a procedure for invoking the rule, and left particular outcomes to individualized judicial determinations—a classic exercise of legislative power.
"All we seek," affirmed a sponsor of § 27A, "is to give the victims [of securities fraud] a fair day in court." 18 A statute, such as § 27A, that removes an unanticipated and unjust impediment to adjudication of a large class of claims on their merits poses no danger of "aggrandizement or encroachment." Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 382.19 This is particularly true for § 27A in light of Congress' historic primacy over statutes of limitations.20 The statute contains several checks against the danger of congressional overreaching. The Court in Lampf undertook a legislative function. Essentially, it supplied a statute of limitations for 10b-5 ac-18 137 Cong. Rec. S18624 (Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bryan).
19 Today's decision creates a new irony of judicial legislation. A challenge to the constitutionality of § 27A(a) could not turn on the sanctity of final judgments. Section 27A(a) benefits litigants who had filed appeals that Lampf rendered frivolous; petitioners and other law-abiding litigants whose claims Lampf rendered untimely had acquiesced in the dismissal of their actions. By striking down § 27A(b) on a ground that would leave § 27A(a) intact, the Court indulges litigants who protracted proceedings but shuts the courthouse door to litigants who proceeded with diligence and respect for the Lampf judgment.
20 "Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. . . . They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. They have come into the law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate. . . . [T]he history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control." Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 314 (1945) (Jackson, J.) (footnote and citation omitted).
Page: Index Previous 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007