McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 52 (1995)

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Cite as: 514 U. S. 334 (1995)

Scalia, J., dissenting

campaign literature. If Buckley remains the law, this is an easy case.

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385

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I do not know where the Court derives its perception that "anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent." Ante, at 357. I can imagine no reason why an anonymous leaflet is any more honorable, as a general matter, than an anonymous phone call or an anonymous letter. It facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very purpose of the anonymity. There are of course exceptions, and where anonymity is needed to avoid "threats, harassment, or reprisals" the First Amendment will require an exemption from the Ohio law. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). But to strike down the Ohio law in its general application—and similar laws of 49 other States and the Federal Government— on the ground that all anonymous communication is in our society traditionally sacrosanct, seems to me a distortion of the past that will lead to a coarsening of the future.

I respectfully dissent.

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