Cite as: 514 U. S. 725 (1995)
Thomas, J., dissenting
In any event, as applied to the present case, the majority's interpretive premise clashes with our decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 456-470 (1991), in which we held that state judges are not protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 621-634 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). Though the ADEA generally protects the employees of States and their political subdivisions, see § 630(b)(2), it exempts from protection state and local elected officials and "appointee[s] on the policymaking level," § 630(f). In concluding that state judges fell within this exemption, we did not construe it "narrowly" in order to preserve the "primary operation" of the ADEA. Instead, we specifically said that we were "not looking for a plain statement that judges are excluded" from the Act's coverage. Gregory, supra, at 467. Moreover, we said this despite precedent recognizing that the ADEA " 'broadly prohibits' " age discrimination in the workplace. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 120 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 577 (1978)). Cf. ante, at 731 (noting "precedent recognizing the FHA's 'broad and inclusive' compass" (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 209 (1972))).
Behind our refusal in Gregory to give a narrow construction to the ADEA's exemption for "appointee[s] on the policy-making level" was our holding that the power of Congress to "legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States" is
prescriptions," see ante, at 737, n. 11, or to its complaint-filing provision, § 810(a), 42 U. S. C. § 3610(a) (1970 ed.) (repealed 1988). Instead, without any reference to the language of the Act, we stated that we could "give vitality to § 810(a) only by a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the statute." 409 U. S., at 212. If we were to apply such logic to this case, we would presumably "give vitality" to § 3607(b)(1) by giving it a generous rather than a narrow construction.
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