City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 23 (1995)

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Cite as: 514 U. S. 725 (1995)

Thomas, J., dissenting

solely of announcing its conclusion that "the formulation [of § 3607(b)(1)] does not fit family composition rules." Ibid. This is not reasoning; it is ipse dixit. Indeed, it is not until after this conclusion has been announced that the majority (in the course of summing up) even defines "family composition rules" at all. See ibid. (referring to "rules designed to preserve the family character of a neighborhood, fastening on the composition of households rather than on the total number of occupants living quarters can contain").

Although the majority does not say so explicitly, one might infer from its belated definition of "family composition rules" that § 3607(b)(1) does not encompass zoning rules that have one particular purpose ("to preserve the family character of a neighborhood") or those that refer to the qualitative as well as the quantitative character of a dwelling (by "fastening on the composition of households rather than on the total number of occupants living quarters can contain"). Ibid. Yet terms like "family character," "composition of households," "total [that is, absolute] number of occupants," and "living quarters" are noticeably absent from the text of the statute. Section 3607(b)(1) limits neither the permissible purposes of a qualifying zoning restriction nor the ways in which such a restriction may accomplish its purposes. Rather, the exemption encompasses "any" zoning restriction—whatever its purpose and by whatever means it accomplishes that purpose—so long as the restriction "regard[s]" the maximum number of occupants. See generally supra, at 739-742. As I have explained, petitioner's zoning code does precisely that.8

8 All that remains of the majority's case is the epithet that my reasoning is "curious" because it yields an "exception-takes-the-rule reading" of § 3607(b)(1). Ante, at 737, n. 11. It is not clear why the majority thinks my reading will eviscerate the FHA's antidiscrimination prescriptions. The FHA protects handicapped persons from traditionally defined (intentional) discrimination, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3604(f)(1), (2), and three kinds of specially defined discrimination: "refusal to permit . . . reasonable modifications of existing premises"; "refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services"; and "failure to design and con-

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