Cite as: 514 U. S. 749 (1995)
Opinion of the Court
Harper, supra, at 133-134 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, 218-225 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). And she quotes Justice Harlan, who, before Chevron Oil, pointed out that "equitable considerations" such as " 'reliance' " might prove relevant to "relief." United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U. S. 286, 296-297 (1970) (concurring opinion).
Thus, Hyde asks, why not look at what the Ohio Supreme Court has done in this case as if it were simply an effort to fashion a remedy that takes into consideration her reliance on pre-Bendix law? Here, the remedy would actually consist of providing no remedy for the constitutional violation or, to put the matter more precisely, of continuing to toll the 2-year statute of limitations in pre-Bendix cases, such as hers, as a state law "equitable" device for reasons of reliance and fairness. She claims that use of this device violates no federal constitutional provision (such as the Due Process Clause) and is therefore permissible.
One serious problem with Hyde's argument lies in the Ohio Supreme Court's legal description of why, in fact, it refused to dismiss Hyde's case. As we have pointed out, the Ohio Supreme Court's syllabus (the legally authoritative statement of its holding) speaks, not about remedy, but about retroactivity. Regardless, we do not see how, in the circumstances before us, the Ohio Supreme Court could change a legal outcome that federal law, applicable under the Supremacy Clause, would otherwise dictate simply by calling its refusal to apply that federal law an effort to create a remedy. The Ohio Supreme Court's justification for refusing to dismiss Hyde's suit is that she, and others like her, may have reasonably relied upon pre-Bendix law—a reliance of the same kind and degree as that involved in Chevron Oil. But, this type of justification—often present when prior law is overruled—is the very sort that this Court, in Harper, found insufficient to deny retroactive application of a new legal rule (that had been applied in the case that first an-
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