Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 10 (1995)

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758

REYNOLDSVILLE CASKET CO. v. HYDE

Opinion of the Court

discharge of their duties.' " Id., at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949)). And, it reflects the concern that "society as a whole," without that immunity, would have to bear "the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office." 457 U. S., at 814. These very facts—that a set of special federal policy considerations have led to the creation of a well-established, independent rule of law—distinguish the qualified immunity cases from the case before us, where a concern about reliance alone has led the Ohio court to create what amounts to an ad hoc exemption from retroactivity.

Finally, Hyde points to the line of cases starting with Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), in which, she says, this Court has held that a habeas corpus petitioner cannot obtain a habeas corpus remedy where doing so would require the habeas court to apply retroactively a new rule of criminal law. The Teague doctrine, however, does not involve a special "remedial" limitation on the principle of "retroactivity" as much as it reflects a limitation inherent in the principle itself. New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed. Cf. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U. S., at 296 (Harlan, J., concurring) (at some point, "the rights of the parties should be considered frozen" and a "conviction . . . final"). And, much as the qualified immunity doctrine embodies special federal policy concerns related to the imposition of damages liability upon persons holding public office, the Teague doctrine embodies certain special concerns—related to collateral review of state criminal convictions—that affect which cases are closed, for which retroactivity-related purposes, and under what circumstances. No such special finality-related concerns are present here.

The upshot is that Hyde shows, through her examples, the unsurprising fact that, as courts apply "retroactively" a new rule of law to pending cases, they will find instances where

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