U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 34 (1995)

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812

U. S. TERM LIMITS, INC. v. THORNTON

Opinion of the Court

such as property, educational, or professional qualifications— for their own representatives, state law would provide the standard for judging a Member's eligibility. As we concluded in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875), federal questions are generally answered finally by federal tribunals because rights which depend on federal law "should be the same everywhere" and "their construction should be uniform." Id., at 632. The judging of questions concerning rights which depend on state law is not, however, normally assigned to federal tribunals. See id., at 636. The Constitution's provision for each House to be the judge of its own qualifications thus provides further evidence that the Framers believed that the primary source of those qualifications would be federal law.

We also find compelling the complete absence in the ratification debates of any assertion that States had the power to add qualifications. In those debates, the question whether to require term limits, or "rotation," was a major source of controversy. The draft of the Constitution that was submitted for ratification contained no provision for rotation.22 In

arguments that echo in the preamble to Arkansas' Amendment 73, opponents of ratification condemned the absence of a rotation requirement, noting that "there is no doubt that senators will hold their office perpetually; and in this situation, they must of necessity lose their dependence, and their attachments to the people." 23 Even proponents of ratifica-22 A proposal requiring rotation for Members of the House was proposed at the Convention, see 1 Farrand 20, but was defeated unanimously, see id., at 217. There is no record of any debate on either occasion.

23 2 Elliot's Debates 309-310 (N. Y., Smith). See also id., at 287-288 (N. Y., G. Livingston) (Senators will enjoy "a security of their re-election, as long as they please. . . . In such a situation, men are apt to forget their dependence, lose their sympathy, and contract selfish habits. . . . The senators will associate only with men of their own class, and thus become strangers to the condition of the common people"); id., at 30-31 (Mass., Turner) ("Knowing the numerous arts that designing men are prone to, to secure their election, and perpetuate themselves, it is my hearty wish that

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