Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peľa, 515 U.S. 200, 11 (1995)

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210

ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA

Opinion of the Court

under the DOT regulations—would meet that requirement. The record does not reveal how Gonzales obtained its certification as a small disadvantaged business.

After losing the guardrail subcontract to Gonzales, Ada-rand filed suit against various federal officials in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, claiming that the race-based presumptions involved in the use of sub-contracting compensation clauses violate Adarand's right to equal protection. The District Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (1992). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 16 F. 3d 1537 (1994). It understood our decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), to have adopted "a lenient standard, resembling intermediate scrutiny, in assessing" the constitutionality of federal race-based action. 16 F. 3d, at 1544. Applying that "lenient standard," as further developed in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547 (1990), the Court of Appeals upheld the use of subcontractor compensation clauses. 16 F. 3d, at 1547. We granted certiorari. 512 U. S. 1288 (1994).

II

Adarand, in addition to its general prayer for "such other and further relief as to the Court seems just and equitable," specifically seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against any future use of subcontractor compensation clauses. App. 22-23 (complaint). Before reaching the merits of Adarand's challenge, we must consider whether Adarand has standing to seek forward-looking relief. Adarand's allegation that it has lost a contract in the past because of a subcontractor compensation clause of course entitles it to seek damages for the loss of that contract (we express no view, however, as to whether sovereign immunity would bar such relief on these facts). But as we explained in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95 (1983), the fact of past injury, "while presumably affording [the plaintiff] standing to claim damages . . . , does

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