216
Opinion of the Court
Korematsu, supra, at 216, carry no less force in the context of federal action than in the context of action by the States— indeed, they first appeared in cases concerning action by the Federal Government. Bolling relied on those observations, 347 U. S., at 499, n. 3, and reiterated " 'that the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race,' " id., at 499 (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 591 (1896)) (emphasis added). The Court's application of that general principle to the case before it, and the resulting imposition on the Federal Government of an obligation equivalent to that of the States, followed as a matter of course.
Later cases in contexts other than school desegregation did not distinguish between the duties of the States and the Federal Government to avoid racial classifications. Consider, for example, the following passage from McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, a 1964 case that struck down a race-based state law:
"[W]e deal here with a classification based upon the race of the participants, which must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States. This strong policy renders racial classifications 'constitutionally suspect,' Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499; and subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny,' Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216; and 'in most circumstances irrelevant' to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100." Id., at 191-192.
McLaughlin's reliance on cases involving federal action for the standards applicable to a case involving state legislation
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