Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 25 (1995)

Page:   Index   Previous  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  Next

Cite as: 515 U. S. 417 (1995)

Souter, J., dissenting

office or employment for purposes of removal," 28 U. S. C. § 2679(d)(2). As the principal opinion concedes, then, ante, at 435, its reading supposes that Congress intended federal courts to retain jurisdiction over state-law tort claims between nondiverse parties even after determining that the Attorney General's certification (and thus the United States's presence as the defendant) was improper. But there is a serious problem, on the Court's reasoning, in requiring a federal district court, after rejecting the Attorney General's certification, to retain jurisdiction over a claim that does not implicate federal law in any way. Although we have declined recent invitations to define the outermost limit of federal-court jurisdiction authorized by the "Arising Under" Clause of Article III of the Constitution,3 see Mesa v. California, 489 U. S. 121, 136-137 (1989); Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480 (1983), on the Court's reading this statute must at the very least approach the limit, if it does not cross the line. This, then, is just the case for adhering to the Court's practice of declining to construe a statute as testing this limit when presented with a sound alternative. Mesa v. California, supra, at 137, citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 693 (1979).

The principal opinion departs from this practice, however. Instead, it looks for jurisdictional solace in the theory that once the Attorney General has issued a scope-of-employment certification, the United States's (temporary) appearance as the sole defendant suffices forever to support jurisdiction in federal court, even if the district court later rejects the Attorney General's certification and resubstitutes as defendant the federal employee first sued in state court. Ante, at 434- 435. Whether the employee was within the scope of his federal employment, the principal opinion reasons, is itself a suf-3 "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . ." U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

441

Page:   Index   Previous  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007