Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 52 (1995)

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Cite as: 515 U. S. 900 (1995)

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

C

The Court's disposition renders redistricting perilous work for state legislatures. Statutory mandates and political realities may require States to consider race when drawing district lines. See supra, at 935. But today's decision is a counterforce; it opens the way for federal litigation if "traditional . . . districting principles" arguably were accorded less weight than race. See ante, at 916. Genuine attention to traditional districting practices and avoidance of bizarre configurations seemed, under Shaw, to provide a safe harbor. See 509 U. S., at 647 ("[T]raditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions . . . are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines."). In view of today's decision, that is no longer the case.

Only after litigation—under either the Voting Rights Act, the Court's new Miller standard, or both—will States now be assured that plans conscious of race are safe. Federal judges in large numbers may be drawn into the fray. This enlargement of the judicial role is unwarranted. The reap-portionment plan that resulted from Georgia's political process merited this Court's approbation, not its condemnation. Accordingly, I dissent.

[Appendixes A and B, containing maps of Georgia's proposed and current Eleventh Districts, and Appendix C, containing a map of the Shaw v. Reno District, follow this page.]

949

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