Cite as: 516 U. S. 99 (1995)
Opinion of the Court
1126 (1995). We now hold that the 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) presumption does not apply to "in custody" rulings; accordingly, we vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment.
II
"[I]n-custody interrogation[s]," this Court recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, place "inherently compelling pressures" on the persons interrogated. 384 U. S., at 467. To safeguard the uncounseled individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Miranda Court held, suspects interrogated while in police custody must be told that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, at the interrogation. Id., at 444. The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Ibid.; see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (duty to give Miranda warnings is triggered "only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody' ") (quoted in Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam)). Our task in petitioner Thompson's case is to identify the standard governing federal habeas courts' review of state-court "in custody" determinations.5
A
Section 2254 governs federal habeas corpus proceedings instituted by persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. In such proceedings, § 2254(d) declares,
5 Claims that state courts have incorrectly decided Miranda issues, as Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680 (1993), confirms, are appropriately considered in federal habeas review.
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