110
Opinion of the Court
"basic, primary, or historical facts: facts 'in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators . . . .' " 372 U. S., at 309, n. 6 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 506 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). "So-called mixed questions of fact and law, which require the application of a legal standard to the historical-fact determinations," the Townsend Court added, "are not facts in this sense." 372 U. S., at 309, n. 6.9 In applying § 2254(d), we have reaffirmed that "basic, primary, or historical facts" are the "factual issue[s]" to which the statutory presumption of correctness dominantly relates. See, e. g., Miller, 474 U. S., at 112 ("[S]ubsidiary factual questions" in alleged involuntariness of confession cases are subject to the § 2254(d) presumption, but "the ultimate question"—requiring a "totality of the circumstances" assessment—"is a matter for independent federal determination."); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 342 (1980) ("mixed determination[s] of law and fact" generally are not subject to the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness).
It must be acknowledged, however, "that the Court has not charted an entirely clear course in this area." Miller, 474 U. S., at 113. In regard to § 2254(d), as in other contexts,10 the proper characterization of a question as one of
9 See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 507 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ("Where the ascertainment of the historical facts does not dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation of the legal significance of such facts, the District Judge must exercise his own judgment on this blend of facts and their legal values. Thus, so-called mixed questions or the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with the federal judge.") (citation omitted).
10 See, e. g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 401 (1990) (observing in regard to appellate review of sanctions imposed under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11: "The Court has long noted the difficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual issues."); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 288 (1982) (acknowledging, in relation to appellate review of intent determinations in Title VII cases, "the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law").
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