118
Thomas, J., dissenting
interrogation"). In making the custody determination, the state trial judge must consider a complex of diverse and case-specific factors in an effort to gain an overall sense of the defendant's situation at the time of the interrogation. These factors include, at a minimum, the location, timing, and length of the interview, the nature and tone of the questioning, whether the defendant came to the place of questioning voluntarily, the use of physical contact or physical restraint, and the demeanor of all of the key players, both during the interview and in any proceedings held in court. In assessing all of these facts, the state trial judge will often take live testimony, consider documentary evidence, and listen to audiotapes or watch videotapes of the interrogation. Assessments of credibility and demeanor are crucial to the ultimate determination, for the trial judge will often have to weigh conflicting accounts of what transpired. The trial judge is also likely to draw inferences, which are similarly entitled to deference, from "physical or documentary evidence or . . . other facts." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 574 (1985). The Miranda custody inquiry is thus often a matter of "shades and degrees," Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 712 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), that requires the state trial judge to make any number of " 'fact-intensive, close calls.' " Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 404 (1990) (citation omitted).
The majority is quite right that the test contains an objective component—how a "reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation," Stansbury v. California, supra, at 324—but this alone cannot be dispositive of whether the determination should be reviewed defer-entially. See, e. g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., supra, at 402 (Rule 11 and negligence determinations, both of which involve objective tests, are subject to deferential review). "[T]he line between pure facts . . . and . . . the application to them of a legal standard that is as non-technical—as commonsensical—as reasonableness is a faint one." United
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