Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 22 (1996)

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Cite as: 516 U. S. 442 (1996)

Stevens, J., dissenting

had concealed compartments for carrying liquor). In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), similarly, a yacht was seized because it had been used "to transport, or to facilitate the transportation of," a controlled substance. See id., at 665-666.8 Here, on the other hand, the forfeited property bore no necessary connection to the offense committed by petitioner's husband. It is true that the act occurred in the car, but it might just as well have occurred in a multitude of other locations. The mobile character of the car played a part only in the negotiation, but not in the consummation, of the offense.

In recent years, a majority of the Members of this Court has agreed that the concept of an instrumentality subject to forfeiture—also expressed as the idea of "tainted" items— must have an outer limit. In Austin, the Court rejected the argument that a mobile home and auto body shop where an illegal drug transaction occurred were forfeitable as "instruments" of the drug trade. 509 U. S., at 621. Justice Scalia agreed that a building in which an isolated drug sale happens to take place also cannot be regarded as an instrumentality of that offense. Id., at 627-628 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice Thomas, too, has stated that it is difficult to see how real property bearing no connection to crime other than serving as the location for a drug transaction is in any way "guilty" of an offense. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 81-82 (1993) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The car in this case, however,

8 The majority questions whether the yacht was actually used to transport drugs, quoting Justice Douglas' dissenting statement that " 'so far as we know' " only one marijuana cigarette was found on board. See ante, at 450. Justice Douglas cited no source for that assertion, however, and it does not appear in the majority or concurring opinions. According to the stipulated facts of the case, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico accused the lessee of using the yacht to "convey, transport, carry and transfer" a narcotic drug. See App. in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., O. T. 1973, No. 73-157, p. 25.

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