520
Thomas, J., dissenting
statutory scheme). Applying this basic rule of statutory construction, I conclude that Congress intended §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) to provide the exclusive mechanism for bringing claims of breach of fiduciary duty.1
If Congress had intended to allow individual plan participants to secure equitable relief for fiduciary breaches, I presume it would have made that clear in §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), the provisions specifically enacted to address breach of fiduciary duty. See Russell, 473 U. S., at 144 (rejecting claim for extracontractual damages for failure timely to provide benefits in part because "the statutory provision explicitly authorizing a beneficiary to bring an action to enforce his rights under the plan—§ 502(a)(1)(B)—says nothing about the recovery of extracontractual damages") (citation omitted). In fact, Congress did provide for equitable relief in § 409, which authorizes "such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate" to redress a breach of fiduciary duty, but it only allowed such relief to be recovered by the plan. Congress did not extend equitable relief to individual plan participants, and we reversed the Court of Appeals in Russell for holding that it did. See id., at 140. Thus, to accept the majority's position, I would have to conclude not only that Congress forgot to provide for individual relief in §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), but that it clearly intended to provide for individual relief in § 502(a)(3), a catchall provision that fails even to mention fiduciary breach and uses language identical to that in § 409, which we have already held authorizes equitable relief only on behalf of the plan. Compare
1 On other occasions we have recognized that "[r]edundancies across statutes are not unusual events in drafting," and that where statutes overlap, courts should give effect to both absent a " 'positive repugnancy' " between them. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992) (quoting Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363 (1842)). But Ger-main and similar cases involved claims of implied repeal, which we have long held should not be recognized unless two statutes irreconcilably conflict. Germain did not involve simultaneously enacted, consecutive provisions of the same Act, as in this case.
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