Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 34 (1996)

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522

VARITY CORP. v. HOWE

Thomas, J., dissenting

solely to individuals. And § 404(a), which the Court holds to be enforceable through § 502(a)(3), provides protection primarily, if not exclusively, for the plan. See Russell, supra, at 142-143, and n. 10. But if § 502(a)(3) allows plan participants to secure equitable relief on behalf of the plan, then § 409's promise of appropriate equitable relief for the plan is entirely redundant. Thus, the Court violates yet another well-settled rule of statutory construction, namely, that "courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous." Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992). Of course, this result could be avoided simply by reading the statute as written and by respecting the canon that specific enactments trump general ones in carefully constructed statutes like ERISA.

B

This is not simply a case about the "specific governing the general," however. Nor is this a case solely about the interrelationship between §§ 409 and 502(a)(3). At every turn lies statutory proof, most of which the majority ignores, that Congress never intended to authorize individual plan participants to secure relief for fiduciary breach under ERISA. The majority also gives short shrift to our decision in Russell. See ante, at 509-510. It is only by overlooking the language and structure of ERISA and our reasoning in Russell that the majority is able to reach the conclusion that it does.

I begin with the Court's failure to address our reasoning and analysis in Russell. We held in Russell that under § 409, "actions for breach of fiduciary duty [must] be brought in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole." 473 U. S., at 142, n. 9. Because the holding in Russell applied only to §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), and because we reserved the question of individual relief under § 502(a)(3), see id., at 139, n. 5, the majority concludes that "Russell does not control, either implicitly or explicitly, the outcome of the case before us." Ante, at 510.

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