Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 13 (1996)

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428

CARLISLE v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

The case law of this Court that petitioner relies upon does not establish any "inherent power" to act in contravention of applicable Rules. In Gaca v. United States, 411 U. S. 618 (1973) (per curiam), which reinstated an appeal that had been dismissed for want of timely prosecution, there was no suggestion that reinstatement was contrary to any statute or rule of procedure. And in United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225 (1975), which approved exercise of a District Court's inherent authority to order the disclosure of certain witness statements, we felt it necessary to make sure that such exercise did not conflict with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Petitioner's best case is Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384 (1964), which, contrary to former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(a), gave effect to a notice of appeal filed more than 60 days from the entry of judgment. Thompson, however, is not pertinent here, since it expressly relied upon the " 'unique circumstances' " that the cause of the failure to meet the Rule's deadline was an erroneous ruling or assurance by the District Court itself. 375 U. S., at 387 (quoting Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215, 217 (1962) (per curiam)).

IV

Petitioner's three remaining arguments need not detain us long. First, he argues that the District Court had power to enter a judgment of acquittal in this case under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651, through the writ of coram nobis. Apart from the fact that the District Court was not asked to

verdict. The dissent apparently thinks it an adequate explanation for this lack of support that, prior to our decision in United States v. Smith, 331 U. S. 469, 474 (1947) (suggesting that sua sponte grant of a new trial may raise double jeopardy concerns), district courts could order new trials where there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict. Post, at 442-443. But if these district courts truly had latent inherent power to enter a judgment of acquittal, surely at least some of them would have been willing to give a legally innocent defendant that to which he was entitled—viz., a judgment of acquittal—rather than just a new trial.

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