Cite as: 517 U. S. 416 (1996)
Opinion of the Court
States, 81 S. Ct. 642 (1961), 5 L. Ed. 2d 683 (Harlan, J., in chambers), Justice Harlan recognized that the provision of former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a) that a "person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be admitted to bail" (emphasis added) did not withdraw district courts' authority to revoke bail in a noncapital case. Fernandez, supra, at 644, and n. 7, 5 L. Ed. 2d, at 685, and n. 7. What admitting to bail implies with respect to revocation of bail is not comparable to what granting judgment on motion implies with respect to granting judgment without motion. What the dissent needs, in the Fernandez context, is a case holding that a statute which permits bail for "persons arrested for noncapital offenses" does not preclude bail for persons arrested for capital offenses. Of course, such a case will not be found.
Finally, the dissent contends that United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267 (1970), supports existence of the "inherent power" petitioner invokes. See post, at 448-449. We think not. Sisson did not "implicitly conclude" that it was proper to enter a postverdict judgment of acquittal without motion, because the propriety of the judgment of acquittal was irrelevant to the decision. The only issue was whether the judgment appealed from was a judgment of acquittal (proper or improper), because that would mean that the Government's appeal under the former 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (which did not apply to judgments of acquittal) must be dismissed. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 351 (1975) (appeal in Sisson "was barred solely by the statute").
* * *
We conclude that the District Court had no authority to grant petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c). We therefore affirm the judgment of the Sixth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
433
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