Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 26 (1996)

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Cite as: 517 U. S. 416 (1996)

Stevens, J., dissenting

trial remedy trenched on the prohibition against double jeopardy, they began to enter judgments of acquittals. See Ex parte United States, 101 F. 2d 870, 878 (CA7 1939), aff'd by an equally divided Court in United States v. Stone, 308 U. S. 519 (1939).

The earliest cases involve appellate courts entering judgments of acquittal in order to remedy a district court's failure to direct the jury to acquit. See Nosowitz v. United States, 282 F. 575 (CA2 1922); Cherry v. United States, 78 F. 2d 334 (CA7 1935); Reiner v. United States, 92 F. 2d 823 (CA9 1937); see also France v. United States, 164 U. S. 676 (1897) (remanding to the District Court with directions to enter such judgment); Romano v. United States, 9 F. 2d 522 (CA2 1925) (same). Later cases reveal that District Courts soon followed suit, either by ruling on reserved, preverdict acquittal motions or by granting postverdict motions to acquit. See Ex parte United States, 101 F. 2d 870 (CA7 1939); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 937 (WD Wis. 1938), aff'd in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 165, n. 1 (1940); State v. Meen, 171 Wis. 36 (1920) (same); see also Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 29 (endorsing these practices). Moreover, prior to the adoption of Rule 29 in 1944, the Fifth Circuit explained that, even after a jury returns a verdict, a court "may and should" sua sponte review the sufficiency of the evidence. Ansley v. United States, 135 F. 2d 207, 208 (1943).

In light of this history, it makes no sense to conclude that a federal district court lacks the inherent power to enter sua sponte a postverdict judgment of acquittal. A trial court's postverdict entry of a judgment of acquittal is in substance no different from an appellate court's order directing entry of that same judgment. Moreover, the double jeopardy concerns that may bar a district court from ordering a new trial to remedy its failure to have directed an acquittal cannot sensibly be understood to prohibit the district court from providing a defendant some measure of relief from a legally

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