448
Stevens, J., dissenting
Procedure 2 directs that the rules "shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay," there is no reason to read the ambiguity in Rule 29(c) to prohibit a district court from correcting a plain error that would otherwise be challenged in a subsequent court proceeding.8
Indeed, our decision in United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267 (1970), reveals that when we previously considered Rule 29 we did not understand it to prohibit a district court from sua sponte entering a postverdict judgment of acquittal. There, defendant's counsel moved postverdict to arrest judgment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 34. 399 U. S., at 276. The District Court purported to grant the Rule 34 motion on evidentiary and constitutional grounds that the defendant's motion did not raise. Id., at 277, n. 6. The Government sought review from this Court pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3731, which at that time permitted governmental appeals from orders arresting judgment but not from orders entering judgments of acquittal. 399 U. S., at 279-280.
In holding that we lacked jurisdiction to hear the Government's appeal, we explained that although the District Court termed its order an "arres[t] [of] judgment," it was in fact an acquittal. Id., at 288. The portion of Justice Harlan's opinion that five Members of the Court joined equated the District Court's sua sponte acquittal with an acquittal by a jury. As support for the comparison, the opinion explained that, under Rule 29, "judges, like juries, can acquit defendants." Id., at 290. Moreover, it noted that Rules 29(b) and
8 The majority dismisses these concerns by suggesting that because we agree that a district court lacks the power to enter a judgment of acquittal after an appeal is taken, we disagree only as to "timing." Ante, at 431. In truth, our point of disagreement is more fundamental. It concerns the power of a court to correct a miscarriage of justice while it retains jurisdiction over a case. Because an appeal can only be taken once a judgment has been entered, the real issue that divides us is whether the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure compel a district court to enter a judgment of conviction against a defendant whom it knows to be innocent.
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