450
Stevens, J., dissenting
missal on the court's own motion. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Harlan explained:
"We do not read Rule 41(b) as implying any such restriction. Neither the permissive language of the Rule—which merely authorizes a motion by the defendant—nor its policy requires us to conclude that it was the purpose of the Rule to abrogate the power of courts, acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief. The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an 'inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Id., at 630-631 (footnote omitted).9
Our practice with respect to petitions for rehearing is also instructive. Such petitions, like motions for a judgment of acquittal, are routinely filed and almost never granted. If not filed within the time specified in our Rules, it is appropriate to deny such a petition without even reading it. On rare occasions, however, we have held that the interest in the evenhanded administration of justice outweighs the interest in finality and granted such petitions even though un-9 In an effort to distinguish Link, the Court asserts that the practice of setting aside insufficient jury verdicts in criminal cases is far less established than was the practice of dismissing cases for want of prosecution. It further contends that the "clarity of the text," ante, at 426, in this case renders the logic of Link inapplicable. Link cannot fairly be read to suggest that inherent powers of recent origin may be more easily withdrawn than those of older vintage. In any event, the court's inherent power to set aside criminal convictions unsupported by evidence has been long accepted. Finally, given that Justice Harlan authored both Link and Sisson, I find most unpersuasive the majority's conclusion that the "clarity of the text" in Rule 29 should occasion a different result from that reached in Link.
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