United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 21 (1996)

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Cite as: 518 U. S. 267 (1996)

Opinion of the Court

We acknowledged in Austin that our categorical approach under the Excessive Fines Clause was wholly distinct from the case-by-case approach of Halper, and we explained that the difference in approach was based in a significant difference between the purposes of our analysis under each constitutional provision. See Austin, supra, at 622, n. 14. It is unnecessary in a case under the Excessive Fines Clause to inquire at a preliminary stage whether the civil sanction imposed in that particular case is totally inconsistent with any remedial goal. Because the second stage of inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause asks whether the particular sanction in question is so large as to be "excessive," see Austin, 509 U. S., at 622-623 (declining to establish criteria for excessiveness), a preliminary-stage inquiry that focused on the disproportionality of a particular sanction would be duplicative of the excessiveness analysis that would follow. See id., at 622, n. 14 ("[I]t appears to make little practical difference whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to all forfeitures . . . or only to those that cannot be characterized as purely remedial," because the Excessive Fines Clause "prohibits only the imposition of 'excessive' fines, and a fine that serves purely remedial purposes cannot be considered 'excessive' in any event"). Forfeitures effected under 21 U. S. C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are subject to review for excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment after Austin; this does not mean, however, that those forfeitures are so punitive as to constitute punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy. The holding of Austin was limited to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and we decline to import the analysis of Austin into our double jeopardy jurisprudence.

In sum, nothing in Halper, Kurth Ranch, or Austin purported to replace our traditional understanding that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Congress long has authorized the Government to bring parallel criminal proceedings and civil

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