Cite as: 518 U. S. 343 (1996)
Thomas, J., concurring
We rejected a disparate-impact theory of the Equal Protection Clause altogether in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976), decided just one Term before Bounds. There we flatly rejected the idea that "a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another." 426 U. S., at 242. We held that, absent proof of discriminatory purpose, a law or official act does not violate the Constitution "solely because it has a . . . disproportionate impact." Id., at 239 (emphasis in original). See also id., at 240 (acknowledging "the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose"). At bottom, Davis was a recognition of "the settled rule that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results." Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 273 (1979).5
and was incarcerated in a prison that apparently did not provide prisoners with lawbooks. See Answer to Respondent's Response to Pet. for Cert. in Gideon v. Wainwright, O. T. 1962, No. 155, p. 1 ("[T]he petitioner is not a [sic] attorney or versed in law nor does not have the law books to copy down the decisions of this Court. . . . Nor would the petitioner be allowed to do so").
Like anyone else seeking to bring suit without the assistance of the State, prisoners can seek the advice of an attorney, whether pro bono or paid, and can turn to family, friends, other inmates, or public interest groups. Inmates can also take advantage of the liberal pleading rules for pro se litigants and the liberal rules governing appointment of counsel. Federal fee-shifting statutes and the promise of a contingency fee should also provide sufficient incentive for counsel to take meritorious cases.
5 Our decisions in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), validated the position taken by Justice Harlan in his dissents in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963). As Justice Harlan persuasively argued in Douglas, facially neutral laws that disproportionately impact the poor "do not deny equal protection to the less fortunate for one essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the States 'an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances.' To so construe it would be
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