Cite as: 518 U. S. 343 (1996)
Opinion of Souter, J.
tainly reserve that issue for the day it might actually be addressed by the parties in a case before us.
In sum, I would go no further than to hold (in a case not involving substantial, systemic deprivation of access to court) that Article III requirements will normally be satisfied if a prisoner demonstrates that (1) he has a complaint or grievance, meritorious or not,3 about the prison system or the validity of his conviction 4 that he would raise if his library research (or advice, or judicial review of a form complaint, or other means of "access" chosen by the State) were to indicate that he had an actionable claim; and (2) the access scheme provided by the prison is so inadequate that he cannot research, consult about, file, or litigate the claim, as the case may be.
"even though it was not alleged that the likely harm would occur immediately and even though the possible [harm] might not affect all of those [at risk]" (discussing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978))). If the State denies prisoners all access to the courts, it is hardly implausible for a prisoner to claim a protected stake in opening some channel of access.
3 See Harris v. Young, 718 F. 2d 620, 622 (CA4 1983) ("It is unfair to force an inmate to prove that he has a meritorious claim which will require access until after he has had an opportunity to see just what his rights are"); see also Magee v. Waters, 810 F. 2d 451, 452 (CA4 1987) (suggesting that a prisoner must identify the "specific problem he wishe[s] to research"); cf. Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F. 3d 794, 798 (CA9 1994) (dismissing a Bounds claim in part because the prisoner "simply failed to show that the restrictions on library access had any effect on his access to the court relative to his personal restraint petition" (emphases in original)), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 825 (1995); Casteel v. Pieschek, 3 F. 3d 1050, 1056 (CA7 1993) (it is enough if the prisoner merely "identif[ies] the constitutional right the defendant allegedly violated and the specific facts constituting the deprivation"); Chandler v. Baird, 926 F. 2d 1057, 1063 (CA11 1991) ("[T]here was no allegation in the complaint or in plaintiff's deposition that he was contemplating a challenge at that time [of the deprivation] to the conditions of his confinement"); Martin v. Tyson, 845 F. 2d 1451, 1456 (CA7) (dismissing a claim in part because the prisoner "does not point to any claim that he was unable to pursue"), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 863 (1988).
4 I do not foreclose the possibility of certain other complaints, see text accompanying n. 2, supra, and Part III-B, infra.
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