404
Stevens, J., dissenting
tirely forfeit certain fundamental rights, including the right to marry, Turner v. Safley, supra, at 95; the right to free speech, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U. S. 401, 407 (1989); and the right to free exercise of religion, see O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U. S. 342 (1987). One can imagine others that would arguably entitle a prisoner to some limited right of access to court. See, e. g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18 (1981) (parental rights); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971) (divorce); cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49-50 (1950) (deportation). This case does not require us to consider whether, as a matter of constitutional principle, a prisoner's opportunities to vindicate rights in these spheres may be foreclosed, and I would not address such issues here.
IV
I therefore concur in Parts I and III of the Court's opinion, dissent from Part II, and concur in the judgment.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. While at least one 19th-century court characterized the prison inmate as a mere "slave of the State," Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871), in recent decades this Court has repeatedly held that the convicted felon's loss of liberty is not total. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84 (1987); e. g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972). "Prison walls do not . . . separat[e] . . . inmates from the protections of the Constitution," Turner, 482 U. S., at 84, and even convicted criminals retain some of the liberties enjoyed by all who live outside those walls in communities to which most prisoners will someday return.
Within the residuum of liberty retained by prisoners are freedoms identified in the First Amendment to the Constitu-
Page: Index Previous 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007