626
Opinion of Kennedy, J.
should be briefed and considered before addressing the constitutionality of such regulation. See United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 92, and n. 9 (1985).
Justice Thomas disagrees and would reach the broader constitutional question notwithstanding the above prudential considerations. In fact, he would reach a great number of issues neither addressed below, nor presented by the facts of this case, nor raised by the parties, for he believes it appropriate here to overrule sua sponte this Court's entire campaign finance jurisprudence, developed in numerous cases over the last 20 years. See post, at 635-644. Doing so seems inconsistent with this Court's view that it is ordinarily "inappropriate for us to reexamine" prior precedent "without the benefit of the parties' briefing," since the "principles that animate our policy of stare decisis caution against overruling a longstanding precedent on a theory not argued by the parties." United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855, 856 (1996). In our view, given the important competing interests involved in campaign finance issues, we should proceed cautiously, consistent with this precedent, and remand for further proceedings.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia join, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.
In agreement with Justice Thomas, post, at 631-634, I would hold that the Colorado Republican Party (Party), in its pleadings in the District Court and throughout this litigation, has preserved its claim that the constraints imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), both on its face and as interpreted by the Federal Elections Commission (FEC), violate the First Amendment.
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