Cite as: 518 U. S. 604 (1996)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
I would resolve the Party's First Amendment claim in accord with these principles rather than remit the Party to further protracted proceedings. Because the principal opinion would do otherwise, I concur only in the judgment.
Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia join as to Parts I and III, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.
I agree that petitioners' rights under the First Amendment have been violated, but I think we should reach the facial challenge in this case in order to make clear the circumstances under which political parties may engage in political speech without running afoul of 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(3). In resolving that challenge, I would reject the framework established by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), for analyzing the constitutionality of campaign finance laws and hold that § 441a(d)(3)'s limits on independent and coordinated expenditures fail strict scrutiny. But even under Buckley, § 441a(d)(3) cannot stand, because the anti-corruption rationale that we have relied upon in sustaining other campaign finance laws is inapplicable where political parties are the subject of such regulation.
I
As an initial matter, I write to make clear that we should decide the Colorado Republican Party's (Party's) facial challenge to § 441a(d)(3) and thus address the constitutionality of limits on coordinated expenditures by political parties. Justice Breyer's reasons for not reaching the facial constitutionality of the statute are unpersuasive. In addition, concerns for the chilling of First Amendment expression counsel in favor of resolving that question.
After the Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought this action against the Party, the Party counterclaimed that "the limits on its expenditures in connection with the general
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