United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 18 (1997)

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Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997)

Opinion of the Court

reading of § 1014 poses no risk of criminalizing so much conduct as to suggest that Congress meant something short of the straightforward reading. The language makes a false statement to one of the enumerated financial institutions a crime only if the speaker knows the falsity of what he says and intends it to influence the institution. A statement made "for the purpose of influencing" a bank will not usually be about something a banker would regard as trivial, and "it will be relatively rare that the Government will be able to prove that" a false statement "was . . . made with the subjective intent" of influencing a decision unless it could first prove that the statement has "the natural tendency to influence the decision," Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S., at 780-781. Hence the literal reading of the statute will not normally take the scope of § 1014 beyond the limit that a materiality requirement would impose.

Finally, the rule of lenity is no help to respondents here. "The rule of lenity applies only if, 'after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,' . . . we can make 'no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.' " Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 65 (1995) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 239 (1993), and Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958)). Read straightforwardly, § 1014 reveals no ambiguity, its mens rea requirements narrow the sweep of the statute, and this is not a case of guesswork reaching out for lenity.

IV

Respondents advance two further reasons to affirm the Court of Appeals's judgment, even on the assumption that materiality is not an element. According to respondents, the trial judge's instruction that "[t]he materiality of the statement . . . alleged to be false . . . is not a matter with which you are concerned and should not be considered by you in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant[s]," App. 43, probably left the jurors with the impression that the statements as alleged would have been material, and

499

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