504
Stevens, J., dissenting
explicit. First, contrary to the Court's assertion, crimes involving "false statements" have a common-law heritage that includes an assumption of a materiality requirement. This conclusion is consistent with our prior holding that the term "misrepresentation" in § 10 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1013, implicitly contained a materiality requirement. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 507-508, and n. 28 (1981). Today the Court discounts the significance of that holding because it assumes that at common law there was a critical difference between a "misrepresentation" and a "false statement." Ante, at 491-492, n. 10. However, Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759 (1988), from which the Court draws this inference, made it perfectly clear that "false statements" share a common-law ancestry with "misrepresentations." 6 At common law, neither term included immaterial falsehoods such as mere flattery.7
6 "The term 'material' in § 1451(a) is not a hapax legomenon. Its use in the context of false statements to public officials goes back as far as Lord Coke, who defined the crime of perjury as follows:
" 'Perjury is a crime committed, when a lawful oath is ministred by any that hath authority, to any person, in any judicial proceeding, who sweareth absolutely, and falsly in a manner material to the issue, or cause in question, by their own act, or by the subornation of others.' 3 E. Coke, Institutes 164 (6th ed. 1680).
"Blackstone used the same term, explaining that in order to constitute 'the crime of wilful and corrupt perjury' the false statement 'must be in some point material to the question in dispute; for if it only be in some trifling collateral circumstance, to which no regard is paid,' it is not punishable. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *137. See also 1 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 27, § 8, p. 433 (Curwood ed. 1824). Given these common-law antecedents, it is unsurprising that a number of federal statutes criminalizing false statements to public officials use the term 'material.' " 485 U. S., at 769 (some emphases added).
See also Saks, United States v. Gaudin: A Decision with Material Impact, 64 Ford. L. Rev. 1157, 1163-1166 (1995) (tracing § 1001 and other federal false statement statutes back to the common law).
7 Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante, at 491-492, n. 10, I do not assume that when Congress criminalizes an element of a common-law crime, the federal offense carries with it every other element of the
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