Cite as: 519 U. S. 482 (1997)
Stevens, J., dissenting
that "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 96 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mindful of this dictate, the Court has routinely rejected literal statutory interpretations that would lead to anomalous results. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citing cases). We have been especially willing to reject a purely literal reading of a federal statute that would, as here, expand its coverage far beyond any common-law antecedent.13 And, as the majority
of any "land, property or security" will be material to any relevant banking transaction. Similarly, the making of a "false report" will presumably be inherently material since the information requested on the report form will be that which the bank deems "capable of influencing" its decision. Read in this context, and drawing on standard statutory construction techniques, see Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117, 129 (1991) (applying "ejusdem generis"—that general terms should be understood in context of specific ones); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995) (resolving statutory question problem with "noscitur a sociis"—that "a word is known by the company it keeps"), "false statement" means those false statements that are material.
13 For instance, in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64 (1994), we held that the "knowingly" requirement of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 U. S. C. § 2252, applied to the age of the individual visually depicted. We interpreted the statute this way even though it flew in the face of the "most natural grammatical reading." 513 U. S., at 68. To hold otherwise, we explained, would lead to results that were "absurd." Similarly, in Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994), we held that the National Firearms Act, 26 U. S. C. §§ 5801-5872, contained an implicit mens rea requirement although one was not apparent on the face of the statute. "Section 5861(d) is silent concerning the mens rea required for a violation," we explained. 511 U. S., at 605. "Nevertheless, silence on this point by itself does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element . . . ." Ibid.
An understanding of these cases also exposes the illogic of the Government's and the Court's reliance on United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10 (1994). In Shabani, lacking a clear textual directive, we declined to depart from the common-law tradition of not requiring proof of an overt act
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