Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 26 (1997)

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376

TIMMONS v. TWIN CITIES AREA NEW PARTY

Stevens, J., dissenting

typical voter.4 We have noted more than once that "[a] State's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some skepticism." Eu, 489 U. S., at 228; Tashjian, 479 U. S., at 221; Anderson, 460 U. S., at 798.

The State's concern about ballot manipulation, readily accepted by the majority, is similarly farfetched. The possibility that members of the major parties will begin to create dozens of minor parties with detailed, issue-oriented titles for the sole purpose of nominating candidates under those titles, see ante, at 365, is entirely hypothetical. The majority dismisses out-of-hand the Party's argument that the risk of this type of ballot manipulation and crowding is more easily averted by maintaining reasonably stringent requirements for the creation of minor parties. Ibid. In fact, though, the Party's point merely illustrates the idea that a State can place some kinds—but not every kind—of limitation on the abilities of small parties to thrive. If the State wants to make it more difficult for any group to achieve the legal status of being a political party, it can do so within reason and still not run up against the First Amendment. "The State has the undoubted right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot, because it is both wasteful and confusing to encumber the ballot with the names of frivolous candidates." Anderson, 460 U. S., at 788-789, n. 9. See also Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431, 442 (1971). But once the State has established a standard for achieving party status, forbidding an acknowledged party to put on the ballot its chosen candidate clearly frustrates core associational rights.5

4 See Brief for Petitioners 41-43; see also ante, at 365.

5 A second "ballot manipulation" argument accepted by the majority is that minor parties will attempt to "capitalize on the popularity of another party's candidate, rather than on their own appeal to the voters, in order

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